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An eternal society with the abilities of ordinary humans in each year of its existence would have had the ability to actualize a logical contradiction. This fact casts doubt on the metaphysical possibility 
of an infinite past.  In addition to using this paradox in an argument 
against an infinite past, one can also use the paradox mutatis mutandis as a 
decisive argument against the sempiternality of God.
1. Background
While José Benardete is often credited as the originator of the Grim 
Reaper paradox, his original paradoxes are inter alia about deafening peals 
from a gong in which there is no first peal, and later about a series of 
assassins (whom he does not refer to as Grim Reapers). In his work Infinity, 
Benardete writes:
Let the peal of a gong be heard in the last half of a 
minute, a second peal in the preceding 1/4 minute, 
a third peal in the 1/8 minute before that, etc. ad 
infinitum.…Of particular interest is the following 
puzzling case. Let us assume that each peal is so very 
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loud that, upon hearing it, anyone is struck deaf—totally 
and permanently. At the end of the minute we shall be 
completely deaf (any one peal being sufficient), but we 
shall not have heard a single peal! For at most we could 
have heard only one of the peals (any single peal striking 
one deaf instantly), and which peal could we have heard? 
There simply was no first peal. We are all familiar with 
various physical processes that are followed by what 
are called after-effects. We are now tempted to coin 
the barbarous neologism of a before-effect. The infinite 
sequence of deafening peals would seem logically to 
entail the before-effect of total deafness. For we must be 
in a state of deafness before each peal….The paradox of 
the before-effect may be generalized over a whole range 
of cases.  A man is shot through the heart during the 
last half of a minute by A. B shoots him through the 
heart during the preceding 1/4 minute, C during the 
1/8 minute before that, &c. ad infinitum. Assuming that 
each shot kills instantly (if the man were alive), the man 
must be already dead before each shot. Thus he cannot 
be said to have died of a bullet wound. Here, again, the 
infinite sequence logically entails a before-effect.
(Benardete 255, 259)
Even in the case of the assassins, Benardete did not believe a true 
contradiction emerges here, but rather that the mereological sum of the 
infinite series of bullets causes the man’s death.  Something similar applies 
to the infinite series of peals; at no instant does any individual peal strike 
one deaf, and yet the peals do make one deaf.
At twelve o’clock sharp, certainly, we were not yet in 
a state of deafness, though at any instant after twelve 
(waiving the infinitesimal tail-end) we are, and have 
been, deaf.  As to the dead man, although he did not die 
of any single bullet wound, his death was certainly caused 
by the infinite fusillade of shots.  Here, again, although 
he is already dead prior to each shot, he remains alive 
at any assigned instant which is prior to them all.  Thus 
he cannot be said to have died at any moment of time 
whatever!  Nor can we be said to have been struck deaf 
at any instant of time.
(Benardete 260)
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After mentioning some of Benedarte’s paradoxes, including the 
paradox of peals and the unfortunate man getting shot in the heart, John 
Hawthorne says:
There is an infinite series of assassins, each tagged with 
a natural number, no pair tagged with the same number, 
no number that isn’t tagged to some assassin. Assassin 
1 is disposed to attack Bob with a machete if Bob is 
still around at 2 pm. If he attacks, he will take half an 
hour to kill Bob. It is causally impossible for assassin 1 
to attack Bob and fail to kill him within half an hour. 
Assassin 2 is disposed to attack Bob with a machete 
if Bob is still around at 1:30 and will take quarter of 
an hour to do it. It is causally impossible for assassin 2 
to attack Bob and fail to kill him within quarter of an 
hour, and so on. Each assassin is unsurvivable as far as 
Bob is concerned....For each time which is such that an 
assassin is disposed to begin attacking Bob at that time, 
there are infinitely many assassins which are disposed to 
attack Bob earlier. 
(Hawthorne 267)
Like Benedarte, Hawthorne here does not conclude a bona fide self-
contradiction emerges and instead believes that the above fusion of the 
assassins causes Bob’s death.  The credit for the paradox of the assassins 
being Grim Reapers—and the adding of crucial details to guarantee a bona 
fide self-contradiction, such as explicitly stipulating that you can die only 
via the motion of a Grim Reaper’s scythe thereby preventing assassination 
by mereological summation—goes to David Chalmers after dutifully 
referencing Benardete and Hawthorne:
There are countably many grim reapers, one for every 
positive integer. Grim reaper 1 is disposed to kill you 
with a scythe at 1pm, if and only if you are still alive then 
(otherwise his scythe remains immobile throughout), 
taking 30 minutes about it. Grim reaper 2 is disposed to 
kill you with a scythe at 12:30 pm, if and only if you are 
still alive then, taking 15 minutes about it. Grim reaper 
3 is disposed to kill you with a scythe at 12:15 pm, and 
so on. You are still alive just before 12pm, you can only 
die through the motion of a grim reaper’s scythe, and 
once dead you stay dead. On the face of it, this situation 
seems conceivable — each reaper seems conceivable 
individually and intrinsically, and it seems reasonable 
to combine distinct individuals with distinct intrinsic 
properties into one situation. But a little reflection 
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reveals that the situation as described is contradictory. I 
cannot survive to any moment past 12pm (a grim reaper 
would get me first), but I cannot be killed (for grim 
reaper n to kill me, I must have survived grim reaper 
n+1, which is impossible). So the description D of the 
situation is prima facie positively conceivable but not 
ideally positively conceivable. 
(Chalmers 154)
Thus it is Chalmers who gives us the sort of Grim Reaper paradox 
that many people think of when using the term “Grim Reaper paradox”—a 
paradox not only of Grim Reapers in a beginningless supertask but also 
with certain specific conditions that make a self-contradiction unavoidable.
It is worth noting this paradox’s ramifications for the metaphysical 
possibility of supertasks in general, or at least those without a beginning 
(when it comes to supertasks of countably infinite events, this is known as 
supertasks of order-type ω* which are order isomorphic to the set of negative 
integers, as opposed to order-type ω supertasks that have a beginning but 
no endpoint and are order isomorphic to the set nonnegative integers) 
(Fletcher 571, 573).  We can envisage each Grim Reaper flipping a lamp 
switch just before he checks on Fred.  It would seem that if a beginningless 
supertask were possible, then the Grim Reaper paradox would be possible. 
Or if one prefers supertasks with only lamps, consider this variant.  There 
is a touch lamp that is on at 8:00 and is turned off only if someone touches 
it.  Jane checks on the lamp at 8:00 + 1∕n hour for all n ∈ ℕ (8:00 + 1∕1 hour, 
8:00 + 1∕2 hour…) to see whether the lamp is turned off.  If it is already 
turned off, she does nothing (or if one considers a supertask requiring the 
agent do something in each successive event, imagine her flipping a lamp 
switch of a different lamp during these instances).  If however the lamp is 
on, she touches the lamp to turn it off.  Is the lamp on or off at 9:00?  As 
in the Grim Reaper paradox, we have a contradiction.  It cannot still be 
turned on because e.g. Jane would have turned the lamp off at 8:30 (8:00 
+ 1∕2 hour) if it were on then.  It is equally impossible for the lamp to be off 
because there is no instance where Jane touches the lamp, and if Jane never 
touches the lamp it remains turned on.
2. An Argument for a Finite Past
Using the Grim Reaper paradox Alexander Pruss created an 
ingenious argument for the finitude of the past. This bears relevance to the 
kalam cosmological argument which argues that the universe began to exist 
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and thus requires a cause.  With the help of Hilbert’s Hotel, a hotel having 
infinitely many rooms, Pruss’s Grim Reaper argument goes like this:
(1) If there could1 be a backwards infinite sequence 
of events, Hilbert’s Hotel would be possible.
(2) If Hilbert’s Hotel were possible, the Grim Reaper 
Paradox could happen.
(3) The Grim Reaper Paradox cannot happen.
(4) Therefore, there cannot be a backwards infinite 
sequence of events.
For (1), Pruss imagines each individual event of an infinite backwards 
series of events creating a room of the famous hotel (and no such room is 
destroyed).  For (2), Pruss imagines a factory in each room of the hotel 
creating a Grim Reaper, and the Grim Reapers then go forth on their 
curious task of paradoxical killing.  Robert Koons has taken inspiration 
from this to develop a more rigorous and mathematical (if not arcane) 
version of this argument (256–267).  In response, one could claim that the 
Grim Reaper paradox is impossible due to the impossibility of arbitrarily 
compressible time (or Grim Reapers), rather than the impossibility of 
an infinite past.  In the remainder of the paper, I will show how these 
concerns can be resolved by considering a thought experiment about an 
eternal society possessing the abilities of ordinary humans in each year of 
its existence.
3. The Eternal Society Paradox
Among other things, humans possess the remarkable ability to 
pass complex information along from one generation to the next. This 
passing of information occurs over a variety of mediums ranging from 
the written word to electro/digital forms of communication.  While it is 
possible that information obtained by one generation will be preserved 
by some method for following generations, this transmission is not 
guaranteed.  For each generation that passes, there is at least a slight 
chance that the transmission of information from one generation to the 
next will be garbled. Consequently, as time rolls forward, this probability 
of mis-transmitting information compounds such that the chance that 
1  Throughout this paper let us assume the type of possibility in question is metaphysical 
possibility, as opposed to e.g. physical possibility.
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the information content of any given proposition will be preserved after 
several quadrillion years is possible, but perhaps unlikely.  Still, what 
matters for our purposes is that it is merely possible for a society, possessing 
the abilities of ordinary humans, to transmit the same propositional 
content year after year indefinitely.  Let us imagine, for the sake of our 
example, that there exists some society known as the Eternal Society that 
has existed sempiternally (existing for a beginningless, infinite duration) 
and has the ability to transmit propositional content indefinitely. The 
Eternal Society also possesses other abilities common to modern humans 
along with many of the usual modern societal amenities (coins, books, 
internet, etc.), in each year of its existence.  When I say that the Eternal 
Society has the abilities of ordinary humans in each year of its existence, by 
this I essentially mean that in each year of its existence the Eternal Society 
can do what we humans can do in contemporary society.  For example, in 
each year, members of the Eternal Society can sing songs, flip coins, write 
books, host marvelous parties, and publish clever paradoxes in philosophy 
journals.  Intuitively, it seems that an Eternal Society would be possible if 
an infinite past were possible.  With the aforementioned abilities of the 
Eternal Society in mind, consider the following scenario:
S
1 
In the Eternal Society there is a ritual known 
as the Annual Coin Flipping Tradition during 
each year of its existence. Each year, as part of 
the tradition, the members of the society flip a 
coin such that if the coin comes up heads, they all 
get together and do a particular chant (the chant 
being “Grim Reapers do not exist!” repeated 
seven times) though only if they have not done 
the chant before; but if the coin does not come up 
heads, they do not do the chant for that year.  Last 
year, the coin came up heads for the first time and 
they did the chant.
Ex hypothesi the Eternal Society can transmit propositional content 
year after year, and so they would be able to keep track of whether they did 
the chant by doing the following each year:
If they did the chant this year:
They transmit the propositional content We did 
the chant to the next year.
If they did not do the chant this year:
If We did the chant was transmitted from the 
previous year, We did the chant is transmitted to 
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the next year.  Otherwise, We did not do the chant 
is transmitted to the next year.
Thus for any given year, the Eternal Society can keep track of whether 
they did the chant before. There are many imaginable ways to keep track 
of this beyond simple oral transmission; e.g. whenever they do the chant, 
they write in a particular webpage that they have done the chant if no 
record of doing the chant already exists in the webpage, and the webpage 
could then be consulted to determine whether they did the chant.  The 
Eternal Society can do anything ordinary humans can do in each year of 
its existence, and ordinary humans certainly have the ability to flip coins, 
create webpages, hold annual traditions, etc.  So S
1
 would be possible if 
an Eternal Society were possible.  Yet S
1
 is not possible, for if it were, the 
following scenario would also be possible:
S
2 
The Eternal Society has the aforementioned 
Annual Coin Flipping Tradition, but the coin 
comes up heads each year of the infinite past.
The coin flips are probabilistically independent events.  If it is 
possible for the coin to not come up heads each year until last year, then 
it would have also been possible for the coin to come up heads each year. 
But in S
2
, did they ever do the chant?  They would have had to have done 
it in some year, for they would have done it last year if they had never done 
it before, and yet there is no year in which they could have done it, because 
no matter which year one points to, there is a prior year in which they 
would have done the chant had they not done the chant before.  They had 
to have done the chant, and yet they could not have done the chant.  We 
thus arrive at a contradiction, and scenario S
2
 is impossible, which then 
makes scenario S
1
 impossible.  Although scenario S
1
 contains no explicit 
self-contradiction, the scenario is impossible because it necessitates the 
possibility of a self-contradiction if the scenario were actualized via implying 
that S
2
 would have been possible.
One could claim that the Eternal Society is possible but the annual 
tradition is not, but this makes little sense given the aforementioned ex 
hypothesi abilities of the Eternal Society in each year of its existence (to 
write books, to flip coins, etc.).  Recall that ex hypothesi they can transmit 
propositional content year after year (by books or otherwise), so that for 
any given year, the Eternal Society can keep track of whether they did 
the chant before.  They can also surely flip a coin each year to decide 
whether to do the chant.  Given all this, what would have happened if 
each year the Eternal Society had tried to engage in the Annual Coin 
Flipping Tradition of doing the chant when the coin comes up heads, with 
the added condition that they do not do the chant if they did it already? 
Wade a. TisThammer56
Presumably, there are no gods of metaphysical possibility who would smite 
the people with lightning should they attempt the annual tradition.  It is 
more plausible that the Eternal Society was never possible in the first place.
Note that if an omnipotent God existed, and He were sempiternal, 
He would be able to actualize scenario S
1
 for himself. Here I am defining 
“God” in such a way that He is a being who is omnipotent in every year 
of his existence.  Since a sempiternal God is omnipotent in each year of 
his existence, He must be able to do the Annual Coin-Flipping Tradition 
each year for the same reasons the Eternal Society can.  Call scenario S
1
 
as applied to God mutatis mutandis scenario S
1G
 and scenario S
2
 applied to 
God mutatis mutandis S
2G
.  Given these conditions, the following argument 
presents itself:
(5) If it were possible for God to have existed for 
an infinite duration, then scenario S
1G
 would be 
possible.
(6) If scenario S
1G






 is not possible.
(8) Therefore, it is not possible for God to have 
existed for an infinite duration.
God thus cannot be eternal in the sense of having existed for a 
beginningless, infinite duration of time, and so the theological doctrine 
of God’s eternity cannot tenably hold to God being sempiternal.  If God 
exists and is eternal, He must have existed timelessly for at least some part 
of His existence, such as existing for the finite age of physical reality and 
being timeless sans creation.
There is perhaps yet another notable theological implication of the 
Eternal Society paradox, one that bears relevance to the kalam cosmological 
argument: time itself has a beginning.  The Eternal Society argument 
against an infinite past goes as follows:
(9) If an infinite past were possible, then an Eternal 
Society would be possible.






 were possible, then S
2
 would be possible.
(12) S
2
 is not possible.
(13) Therefore, an infinite past is not possible.
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While I think there is a sense in which the subjunctive mood is 
appropriate for (9)–(11), we can also consider the conditionals (9)–(11) 
as truth-functional material conditionals (“would” counterfactuals imply 
material conditionals anyway) to lucidly find where the slippery slope 
stops.  Which of the (9)–(11) premises is such that it has a true antecedent 
with a false consequent?  If I were a stubborn adherent of the infinite past, 
I would deny premise (9) since that seems to be the most vulnerable one. 
Yet I do not find this denial of (9) entirely satisfactory.  While people’s 
intuitions may vary, it does seem like an Eternal Society with its modest 
human abilities of coin flipping etc. would be possible if an infinite past 
were possible, and that if such a society is not possible due to its ability to 
create a logically contradictory situation, so much the worse for an infinite 
past.  Surely there is something metaphysically suspicious about an infinite 
past if an eternal society with the abilities of ordinary humans can actualize 
a logical contradiction.  By my lights, it is more plausible that an infinite 
past was never possible in the first place.
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